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 Abstract 
The objective of this thesis is to examine the differences in residential property 
prices across different cities in India. Soaring prices have led to increasingly unaffordable 
property prices in large metropolitan cities. As a result, there has been academic 
discourse about the existence of a housing bubble in recent years. In the past, empirical 
research has focused on national level trends due to a lack of city-level data. I investigate 
the city-fixed effects on growth in house prices across fifteen different cities. Although 
different empirical models suggest different conclusions about these effects, point 
estimates suggest above-normal growth in house prices in Delhi for the period 2009-
2013.   
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I. Introduction 
The real-estate industry is inextricably linked to socio-economic growth and 
development. Increasing the availability and affordability of housing can improve the 
quality of life for citizens, and the overall development of infrastructure improves 
productivity within the economy. House prices also indirectly impact macroeconomic 
health through the wealth effect: as house prices rise, home-owners feel wealthier and are 
likely to increase consumption and boost aggregate demand (Calomiris, Longhofer, & 
William, 2012).  
The residential real-estate industry in India is complex and dynamic. Varying 
economic and demographic characteristics across the country result in differences in the 
housing markets in different cities. While soaring prices have led to speculation about a 
housing bubble in large cities like Mumbai and Delhi, prices in tier-II and tier-III cities 
such as Kochi and Hyderabad have remained relatively stagnant (NHB, 2013). Demand 
for housing has increased in recent years due to rising per capita incomes, the increasing 
penetration of housing finance, and increasing population density in urban areas. The 
growing middle class, expected to grow from 224 million to 583 million by 2025, has 
added to existing pressure on the demand for housing (Mustafi, 2013).  
The Indian government is faced with several challenges as it attempts to stabilize the 
housing market and increase accessibility to affordable housing. In light of rising 
inflation and twin current account and fiscal deficits, the government has attempted to 
increase liquidity and encourage household saving during 2012-13 by pursuing tight 
monetary policy (Moneycontrol, 2013). Consequently, investment growth in the 
industrial sector experienced a slowdown and contributed - along with a slowdown in the 
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industrial, agriculture and services sector- to a decline in GDP growth to 5 percent in 
2012-13 (Moneycontrol, 2013) . Residential real-estate markets have followed suit, with 
Mumbai and Delhi experiencing a 0.5 percent and 1.5 percent fall in prices respectively, 
and cities like Chennai and Kolkata dropping by 2.3 percent and 4.1 percent respectively 
(Kumar, 2013).  
The objective of this paper is to examine how the macroeconomic environment and 
monetary policy impact trends in house prices in different cities. I will test the hypothesis 
that house prices in certain metropolitan cities such as Delhi and Mumbai have seen 
above-normal growth rates in recent years. My hypothesis is motivated by literature 
speculating about existence of a housing bubble in these cities (Anand, 2010).  
In order to test my hypothesis I construct a panel of fifteen cities for fifteen quarters 
since 2009. I use a fixed effects model to account for omitted variables that cannot be 
measured and attempt to determine whether large metropolitan cities display positive 
fixed effects in house price growth. I then investigate whether the slowdown of the Indian 
economy since 2010-11 has impacted the growth of house prices (Schaffer, 2013).  
In the past, literature pertaining to residential real-estate markets in India has focused 
on national level house prices as well as analysis of certain cities such as Mumbai 
(Gandhi, 2000).  However, the vast majority of this literature is outdated. Since 2007, the 
National Housing Bank has published a house price index (HPI) called the Residex for 
fifteen cities in India and my objective is to use this to demonstrate city-wise variation in 
house markets while controlling for economy-wide interest rates. 
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My results suggest that the real interest rate is statistically significant, and negatively 
related to change in house prices as basic economic theory would suggest (Mankiw, 
2011). Although point estimates suggest that four out of the six metropolitan cities 
(including Delhi and Mumbai) display above-normal increases in house prices, different 
ways of computing the standard errors suggest different conclusions about the 
significance of these results.  
There are two major qualifications for the empirical analysis I present in this thesis. 
Firstly, that I use 2007 as a base year. By this time, prices in metropolitan cities had 
already surpassed those in other cities. Prior to 2009, both Delhi and Mumbai had 
experienced periods of rapid growth in house prices
1
. As a result, the available data does 
not capture the full extent of above-normal house price growth rate experienced in these 
cities. Secondly, urbanization and demographic trends that contribute to the pressure on 
housing markets could not be accounted for in this dataset due to the fact that census data 
is reported in five year intervals and because economic data used to construct my 
independent variables is unavailable at the city-level.  
                                                          
1
 Figure 3 
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II. Literature Review 
The literature pertaining to the real-estate market in India consists primarily of reports 
published by the Reserve Bank of India and by the National Housing Bank. The Report 
on Trend and Progress of Housing in India (2012) describes the dynamics of the housing 
market in India. The National Housing Bank was established by the Reserve Bank of 
India in 1988 in order to promote private real estate acquisition. The NHB is also 
responsible for regulating and refinancing social housing programs. In its yearly reports, 
the organization summarizes the issues concerning housing in India. The primary focus is 
the availability of affordable housing and some of the impediments include 
overpopulation of certain areas, the lack of affordable finance, infrastructure and 
regulatory hurdles.  Urbanization has led to demographic changes across the country. 
According to census data, the percentage of population living in urban areas rose from 28 
to 31 percent between 2006 and 2011, and is estimated to have risen further in recent 
years (NHB, 2012). 
Publications by the Reserve Bank of India focus on the deployment of housing 
finance in India. Mohanty (2013) discusses the future of housing finance in light of the 
demand-supply gap, favorable demographics and increasing urbanization. He asserts the 
need to preserve financial stability along with attempts to increase the availability of 
housing finance and presents evidence from Reinhard and Rogoff (2009) to illustrate that 
the six major banking crises in advanced economies since the mid-1970s were associated 
with a housing bust. Mohanty compares the housing market in India with the housing 
market in the US, observing several crucial differences such as “the predominance of new 
construction and first time ownership” in India. Yet, he suggests it is important to apply 
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lessons learned from the sub-prime crisis in order to prevent a financial crisis due to a 
housing bust.   
Gandhi (2012) describes the pressure on house prices in Mumbai over recent years.  
As the city became a center for economic and commercial activities, Mumbai 
experienced a rapid growth in population leading to distortions in the housing markets in 
India that impede the availability of affordable housing. The paper illustrates a mismatch 
between household income and house prices evidenced by the fact that “at the present 
income distribution and institutional rates, only 5-6 percent of households can afford a 
house in Mumbai” (Gandhi, 2012). It also illustrates a violation of the household’s stock 
and flow principle that is essential for equilibration in the housing sector (Lipsey & 
Harbury, 2004). When measured against the distance from a city’s central business 
district, most cities in the world have a downward sloping Floor Space Index (FSI) 
(Bertraud, 2010). However, property prices in Mumbai violate the principle that there is a 
flat FSI line against distance from the city center. In these big cities, house developers 
cater to a small proportion of the population – the rich elite – by focusing on the 
construction of luxury housing (Gandhi, 2012). Although Gandhi focuses on Mumbai in 
his paper, he suggests that most Indian cities face “issues of infrastructure, slum 
proliferation and inefficient urban land management” in the housing sector.  
Several pieces of economic literature describe the relationship between residential 
real-estate and the macroeconomy. Goodheart & Hoffman (2007) examine the effects of 
house prices on the macroeconomic environment to demonstrate how a contraction in 
house prices can have “a severe contractionary effect on output” and that house prices 
reflect changes is beliefs and economic speculation. DiPasquale & Wheaton (1996) 
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distinguish between a micro and a macro approach to real estate markets. The micro 
approach emphasizes the importance of structural and geographic factors in determining 
house prices. Wheaton suggests that structural characteristics such as the level of 
development affect the willingness to pay across different locations. The macro approach 
deals with the effect of high level forces such as growth, industry and competitiveness on 
real-estate markets in different cities.  
 Case and Shiller (2004) discuss the role of expectations in causing a bubble in the 
housing market, identifying this as a situation in which “excessive public expectations of 
future price increases cause prices to be temporarily elevated.” The rapid growth in house 
prices that have been seen across several cities in India is considered to be the first sign 
of a bubble. Yet, this is not conclusive evidence for the existence of a bubble. The extent 
to which changes in macroeconomic fundamentals, including incomes and interest rates, 
explain these growth rates can give us insight into whether it is appropriate to speculate a 
bubble.  
Joshi (2006) examines preliminary evidence to suggest the existence of an asset 
bubble in the Indian housing market. He used a structural VAR model proposed by 
Blanchard and Quah (1989) to study the shocks to house prices that can be attributed to 
the monetary variables and income growth. The paper concludes that the Indian housing 
market was well equilibrated and that the risk of a bubble was not significant at this time. 
Another important finding was that monetary policy, specifically the interest rate, was the 
single most important determinant of the future growth of the housing market. 
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III. Macroeconomic Overview 
India, the world’s fourth-largest economy with a population of 1.2 billion, is still in 
crucial stages of economic development. Over the past decade, the country has seen 
tremendous growth and change.  According to the Macro-economic Framework 
Statement issued by the Ministry of Finance, The decadal average growth rate 2003-04 to 
2012-13 was reported at 7.9 percent, with several consecutive years of 9 percent growth 
rates before the financial crisis of 2008. Since 2011-12 the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) 
has been using tight monetary policy to deal with uncertainty in the global economy. As a 
result, industrial growth has slowed in recent years and gross domestic product at factor 
cost was reported at 5 percent for 2012-13 (Ministry of Finance, 2013).  Simultaneously, 
inflation has been accelerating with Wholesale Price Inflation (WPI) rising to 6.46 
percent in September, 2013 and inflation rising to 9.84 percent (Kala, 2013). The Indian 
economy has been running twin deficits with a fiscal deficit of US$147 billion and a 
current account deficit at 4.6 percent of GDP (Ministry of Finance, 2013). The adoption 
of tight monetary policy has resulted in a decline in quarterly growth rate of GDP and 
declining government revenues from the industrial sector. Furthermore, negative export 
growth rates have led to unfavorable balance of payments. Simultaneously, the Indian 
Rupee has been on a downward trend since August 2011 and hit an all-time low of INR 
68.80 against the US Dollar in August 2013 (Ministry of Finance, 2013).  
The real-estate industry plays a crucial role within the dynamic landscape of the 
Indian economy. In 2013, it is estimated that the real-estate market contributed to 6.3 
percent of GDP (IBEF, 2013). This sector is projected to generate 7.6 million jobs in this 
period, and over 17 million by 2025 (IBEF, 2013). In India, housing ranks fourth in terms 
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of the multiplier effect on the economy and third in terms of its linkages to ancillary 
industries (NHB, 2012). It is the second largest employment generator and provides jobs 
to approximately 33 million people (NHB, 2012). Rising incomes, favorable 
demographics, urbanization and inflows of foreign investments has led to an increase in 
the demand for housing which has not been met with supply. On average, property values 
have quadrupled in the last decade with rising property prices in urban areas and the 
housing shortage is estimated at approximately 19 million households (Srivastava, 2013; 
KPMG, 2012). 
Over the past decade there has been a widespread expectation of rising property 
prices and speculation of a housing bubble in large metropolitan cities. It had been 
common for middle class buyers to buy houses with the intent of selling them a few years 
later for a 15 -20 percent gain. In metropolitan cities like Mumbai and Delhi, houses that 
are in the process of being constructed were sold for less than what the builder would sell 
them for, to buyers who plan on re-selling them in the near future. Yet, according to the 
Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation approximately 11.09 million homes 
in urban areas remain empty (KPMG, 2012). Sellers have been holding out in hope that 
property prices will continue to appreciate. As a result, houses have become increasingly 
unaffordable for the middle class buyer.  
The recent downturn in the Indian economy has led to an overall slump in the housing 
market. The House Price Index (HPI) has been on a downward trend in 22 out of the 26 
cities monitored by the National Housing Bank (NHB, 2013). Investor-driven real estate 
markets such as certain areas in Delhi and Mumbai have seen more than 10 percent fall in 
prices due to a slowing liquidity, a lack of buyers and a decline of investor confidence in 
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the property market (Chadha, 2013). Against the backdrop of falling prices, the question 
about a housing bubble and a potential housing bust has become increasingly pertinent.  
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IV. Dynamics of the Housing Market 
Two industries closely linked to the housing market in India are the housing finance 
industry and the construction industry.  The market for home loans is expected to grow at 
a ~17 percent CAGR over the next five years due to increase in the number of 
transactions, a higher loan to value (LTV) ratio and increasing property prices (Rupee 
Manager, 2013). The two major players that operate within this space are Housing 
Finance Companies (HFCs) and Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs). While HFCs are 
regulated by the National Housing Bank (NHB), SCBs are regulated by the Reserve Bank 
of India. While SCBs dominated the market in the late 1990s due to the prevalence of 
low interest rates, rising incomes and stable property prices, the current market share is 
split almost equally between the two (Rupee Manager, 2013). The main difference 
between these institutions is their source of funds, with banks depending on their own 
equity reserves and HFCs depending on loans from banks, financing from the NHB, fixed 
deposits from the public and borrowing through bonds and debentures in addition to their 
own equity reserves (Rupee Manager, 2013). In recent years, the availability of 
affordable home loans at low interest rates has been increasing. The Indian government 
has played a role in this, by offering tax concessions to boost demand for housing. As a 
result, the penetration of housing finance has reached an estimated 38 percent in urban 
areas (Prem, 2012). 
In spite of the recent growth in demand for housing, there are several constraints to 
real estate development. Firstly, there is a shortage of land in urban areas with growing 
population densities as a result of urbanization. The shortage of land is exacerbated by 
the existence of the Urban Land Ceiling Act passed in 1976 that restricts the land 
available for construction and development (KPMG, 2012). In 2007, the state of 
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Maharashtra repealed this Act, releasing close to 3,000 acres for development in Mumbai 
(CNN IBN, 2007). Nevertheless, inefficient land use by the public sector continues to 
limit its availability. 
Secondly, cumbersome regulation lengthens the process and increases the cost of 
housing development. Estimates suggest that real estate developers need to pass 
approvals through 150 tables in 40 government departments. Delays in approvals add 25-
30 percent to project costs and it currently takes two to three years for a developer to 
begin construction after purchasing land (KPMG, 2012).Lastly, rising construction costs 
further impede the development of real estate. While land forms the largest component of 
premium residential real-estate projects, construction costs are 50 to 60 percent of the 
selling price for affordable housing (KPMG, 2012). 
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VI. Data  
My approach is modeled after a research paper published by the Reserve Bank of 
India (Joshi, 2006). In order to investigate the existence of a housing price bubble, Joshi 
employs a structural VAR model proposed by Blanchard and Quah (1989) to study the 
impact of monetary variables and income growth on the housing price shocks in India. 
My objective is to test the extent to which the macroeconomic fundamentals support the 
growth rate of national level house prices.  I build on Joshi (2006) to test the hypothesis 
that there is a city-fixed effect that impacts the relationship between the macroeconomic 
fundamentals and the growth in house prices. Additionally, I use Joshi (2006) to inform 
the use of appropriate proxies for residential real-estate market data that is not available 
on a quarterly basis. I construct a panel of fifteen tier-I and tier-II cities over 15 quarters 
since 2009 using time series data published by the Reserve Bank of India.  
Dependent Variable 
In order to assess whether house price growth is supported by the macroeconomic 
fundamentals, I use the quarterly growth in house prices for each city as my dependent 
variable: hg. This growth rate is based on an Index constructed by the National Housing 
Bank (NHB) called the Residex or the House Price Index (HPI). The Residex is 
calculated using primary data on house prices from real-estate agents and housing finance 
companies using a weighted average method. The quarterly growth rate is calculated as: 
                              
 (1) 
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Independent Variables 
My dependent variables include measures and proxies of macroeconomic 
fundamentals expected to impact growth in house prices.  
real_ir represents the quarterly real interest rates. Modeled after the RBI report, 
the weighted-average call money rate is used as a proxy for the interest rate on home 
loans because housing finance companies and scheduled commercial banks change their 
rates in sync with the short term money market rates. infl_rate represents the quarterly 
levels of Consumer Price Index to reflect changes in overall price inflation. This interest 
rate is adjusted for the change in inflation during each quarter, and therefore represents 
the real interest rate: 
                                 
(2) 
creditg is a proxy for quarterly growth in credit deployment to the housing sector. 
It is a measure of non-food credit deployment, of which housing credit forms a large 
proportion (Joshi, 2006) and is calculated as follows: 
                                      
(3) 
gdpg represents the quarterly growth in India’s Gross Domestic Product and is 
used as a proxy for overall growth in demand. However, given that the housing sector 
forms a significant proportion of GDP, it is difficult to determine whether GDP growth is 
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representative of changes in overall demand or reflective of growth in construction in the 
real-estate sector.   
                             
 (4) 
The following table displays the summary statistics for each variable: 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
      
hg 210 2.67% 7.67% -16.80% 31.11% 
real_ir 210 4.67% 1.86% 1.47% 8.26% 
gdpg 210 2.34% 5.46% -6.85% 9.71% 
creditg 210 4.27% 1.68% 0.81% 7.17% 
infl_rate 210 2.23% 5.04% 0% 4.15% 
 
Limitations 
Several constraints limited the number and types of variables I chose to include. 
Firstly, my variables reflect changes in macroeconomic fundamentals rather than city-
level economic fundamentals due to the unavailability of city-level data. A more 
appropriate test for the existence of a bubble would measure the deviation of house prices 
from economic demand and supply within the city. Given that different cities in my 
sample are in different stages of economic development, they have different levels of 
income, financial penetration and residential construction. Secondly, the model could be 
improved by including a variable related to housing construction as a proxy for the 
supply side of the residential real-estate industry.   
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Thirdly, the data captures only part of the time period during which there has been 
speculation about a housing bubble. A more appropriate model would include data 
extending to the early 2000s when property prices in big metropolitan cities first began to 
soar
2
.  
Lastly, although the goal of this thesis is to investigate the housing bubble 
hypothesis by testing for deviation from macroeconomic fundamentals, the Case-Shiller 
method of comparing growth in house prices with growth in rental yields could provide 
more conclusive results about the existence of a property bubble. One of the major 
qualitative motivations for my hypothesis is that Indian home-buyers are often more 
concerned with purchasing houses as investments than rental gains. A model 
investigating the extent to which growth in home prices can be explained by growth in 
rental yields, reflecting demand for living space could provide valuable insights into the 
existence of a bubble.  
                                                          
2
 Figure 2 
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VII. Methodology 
My starting point to investigate the relationship between macroeconomic 
fundamentals and growth in house prices across different cities is a fixed effects model 
assuming heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors
3
: 
                                                                          
  : the unknown intercept for each entity (i=1…n) 
                : the dependent variable (i= entity and t= time) 
        : the coefficient for the independent variables 
    : the error term 
I construct binary variables for each city and each time period in order to investigate city-
fixed effects in the growth of house prices. I test the effects of grouping Delhi and 
Mumbai under the variable large_city in order to investigate whether there is a difference 
in the way that house prices in these markets respond to a change in macroeconomic 
fundamentals. Additionally, I include the independent binary variable time1 to test for an 
effect on house price growth in the period of macroeconomic slowdown in FY11-12. 
I modify my model based on preliminary insights into the explanatory power of 
my economic variables. I graph the residuals on the heteroscedasticity-robust fixed 
effects model in order to look for autocorrelation and consider the effects of clustering 
the cross-sectional residuals.  
Finally, I investigate the effects of imposing structure on the residuals by using a 
panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) model and a First Order Autoregressive (AR(1)) 
                                                          
3
 the variance of the residuals is not consistent across all observation points 
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model to test the hypothesis that the residual     is related to the residual in the previous 
period,       across cities at each point in time.  
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VIII. Results 
Table 1 displays the results of the heteroscedasticity-robust fixed effects 
regression. The coefficients can be interpreted as follows: 
                                                         
 This model attempts to explain the variation of     , the house price growth for 
city   in time period   that is explained by the real interest rate, inflation rate, and GDP 
growth rate since the previous quarter
4
.  The growth in real interest rate, real_ir and the 
growth in GDP, gdpg are statistically significant at 5 percent level. The coefficient on 
real_ir suggests that a 0.679 percentage point decline in the real interest rate leads to an 
increase in the growth rate of house prices by 1 percentage point.  
The negative coefficient on gdpg suggests that a 0.212 percentage point decline in 
GDP quarterly growth rate is associated with a 1 percentage point increase in the 
quarterly growth rate of house prices. This result is counter-intuitive if we consider GDP 
to be a proxy for demand. However, there are two plausible explanations for the result. 
Firstly, it might suggest that GDP growth is a closer proxy for the supply-side of 
residential real estate. Therefore, a decline in supply leads to an increase in house prices. 
Alternatively, this negative relationship can be representative of a deviation of house 
prices from the macroeconomic fundamentals if the growth of house prices is unrelated to 
aggregate demand within the country. The negative coefficient on infl_rate reinforces the 
latter explanation by suggesting that growth in house prices is not positively correlated 
with overall inflation. The adjusted    of this model is 0.023, indicating that only 2.3 
percent of the variation in      is explained by the model. 
                                                          
4                             
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Table 2 displays the results of including a binary variable which takes a value of 
1 in the period before the economic slowdown of 2010-11 (period1) in the original 
regression. period1 is statistically significant at the 1 percent level and gdpg at the 5 
percent level according to this model.  
                                                         
               
The positive coefficient on period1 suggests that quarterly growth in house prices 
was higher in the period before 2011-12. gdpg is again found to be statistically significant 
negatively correlated with house price growth. The adjusted    indicates that this model 
explains 6 percent of variation in     . In other words, the macroeconomic variables 
included in this model account only for 6 percent of the quarterly growth in house prices.  
Table 3 displays the results of including a time trend along with the economic 
variables. While including period along with the variables in the previous regression did 
not generate statistically significant results, including the time trend with the 
macroeconomic variables previously found to be significant generates a small, negative 
coefficient of 0.00235 that is significant at the 10 percent level. Several variables were 
developed to draw out conclusive results on the effect of large metropolitan cities, 
including Delhi, Mumbai, large_city (Delhi and Mumbai). The results in Table 4 indicate 
that none of the city variables are statistically significant.  
The low explanatory power and varying levels of statistical significance on the 
coefficients suggest that these models do not yield clear robust interpretable insights into 
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the impacts of macroeconomic variables. Therefore, I adopt a different approach and 
control for all macroeconomic movements using time period binary variables.  
Table 5 displays the results of including binary variables to test for city-fixed 
effects and time-fixed effects with hetereoscedasticity-robust standard errors. Although 
none of the coefficients on city-fixed effects are statistically significant, point estimates 
suggest that house price growth varies across the country with Bengaluru, Chennai, 
Delhi, Mumbai, Lucknow and Pune displaying higher point estimates. It is noteworthy 
that this includes four out of the six metropolitan cities in India. Several time periods 
emerge as statistically significant, indicating that period binary variables were 
appropriate in order to control for macroeconomic fluctuations. Additionally, the 
significance of period-fixed effects can be reconciled with the insight that the 
macroeconomic slowdown in FY2011-2012 had an effect on the residential real estate 
market.  
Next, I turn my attention towards the residuals in order to investigate alternative 
models that could be appropriate. Figure 1 depicts the residuals of the time and entity-
fixed effects regression assuming heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. The graph 
suggests that the residuals are not random and correlated with adjacent observations. I 
therefore test other models with auto-correlated standard errors.  
 Table 6 displays the results of a clustering the standard errors on each city 
assuming that they are heteroscedastic and auto-correlated. Although point estimates of 
some cities (Delhi, Mumbai, Bengaluru, Chennai, Lucknow and Pune) are still higher 
than the rest, the standard error on all entity fixed effects are now substantially lower, 
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making the coefficients significant at the 0.1 percent level. The implausibly low standard 
error terms on each city, however, motivate me to test other models with auto-correlated 
standard errors that impose more structure.  
Table 7 displays the results of the city-fixed effects generated by three different 
models used to impose structure on the standard errors. Model (1) imposes a common 
AR1 autocorrelation structure assuming panel-level heteroscedastic errors (no cross-
sectional correlation). Model (2) imposes a panel-specific AR1 autocorrelation structure 
and Model (3) imposes a panel-specific AR1 autocorrelation structure with panel-level 
heteroscedastic errors. All three models suggest that Hyderabad has a negative 
coefficient, statistically significant at the 10 percent level. This suggests that house price 
growth has been below-normal in Hyderabad. Model (2), imposing AR1 autocorrelation 
assuming no cross-sectional correlation, suggests that house prices in Kolkata display 
below-normal growth (statistically significant at the 1 percent level). These models 
display   s of 0.295, 0.325 and 0.325 respectively, suggesting that the first model 
explains ~30 percent of the variation in     , and the models imposing panel-specific 
AR1 autocorrelation structure explain ~33 percent.  
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IX. Conclusion 
According to the available data, different models suggest that different 
conclusions can be drawn about the statistical significance of macroeconomic factors 
affecting the growth in house prices across India. Contrary to the literature, and 
speculation about property bubbles in large metropolitan cities, my results do not provide 
conclusive evidence for above-normal growth rates. One major qualification of the data, 
however, is that it begins in 2009. Figure 2 shows trends in house prices during 2001-
2013 and Figure 3 shows house price growth in Delhi and Mumbai during the same 
period. The graphs suggest that Delhi and Mumbai both display above-normal house 
price levels, and rapid growth rates between 2005-2007 and 2011-12. Rapid increases in 
growth rates during some periods justify the intuition guiding speculation about a house 
price bubble. However, the evidence presented in this paper reinforces evidence 
presented by Joshi (2006), suggesting that the increases in prices are not enough to draw 
conclusive evidence about the existence of a bubble.  
My findings suggest that a shift in the overall macroeconomic environment during 
FY11-12, however, had an impact on overall growth in house prices. Due to shifts in 
demographics and urbanization, residential-real estate markets are continuously evolving 
across different cities within the country. A more appropriate test to evaluate the city-
specific effects of different housing markets would include population data to account for 
shifts in population, construction data to account for the varying levels of real-estate 
development across the country, and credit-penetration data to account for the differences 
in access to housing finance across different cities. Although the findings of this thesis 
are inconclusive about the existence of an asset bubble in the residential real-estate 
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market, it is imperative that future research builds on city-level models in order to 
investigate the trends in house prices.   
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 XI. Appendix 
 
Table 1: xtreg real_ir infl_rate gdpg, fe vce(robust) 
  
           hg 
             
real_ir -0.679* 
 
(0.305) 
infl_rate -0.519  
 
(0.310)  
gdpg -0.212*  
 
(0.0739)  
_cons  0.0802**  
 
(0.0244) 
N 210  
adj. R-sq 0.023 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10 *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 2: xtreg hg real_ir infl_rate gdpg period1, fe vce(robust) 
  
           hg 
             
real_ir 0.545 
 
(0.478) 
infl_rate 0.647  
 
(0.738)  
gdpg -0.233*  
 
(0.0923)  
   
period1 0.0535**   
 (0.0171)  
 
_cons  -0.0307  
 
(0.0431) 
N 210  
adj. R-sq 0.060 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10 *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 3: (1) xtreg hg real_ir infl_rate gdpg period, fe vce(robust) 
   (2) xtreg hg real_ir gdpg period, fe vce(robust) 
 
  (1) (2) 
  hg hg    
   real_ir           -0.374 -0.181 
 
(0.427) (0.313) 
   infl_rate          -0.367               
 
(0.654)               
   gdpg                -0.195+ -0.168*   
 
(0.0955) (0.067) 
   period            -0.00159 -0.00235+   
 
(0.00141) (0.0013) 
   _cons               0.0704* 0.0591*** 
 
(0.0267) (0.0133) 
   N                      210 210 
adj. R-sq           0.021 0.025 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10 *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 4: (1) reg hg large_city real_ir gdpg period, robust 
  (2) reg hg Delhi real_ir gdpg period, robust 
 (3) reg hg Mumbai real_ir gdpg period, robust 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
        hg hg hg    
        
large_city 0.0182 
 
                
 
(0.0119) 
 
                
    real_ir -0.181 -0.181 -0.181 
 
(0.327) (0.328) -0.329 
    gdpg -0.168+ -0.168+ -0.168+ 
 
(0.0957) (0.096) (0.0959) 
    period -0.00235+ -0.00235+ -0.00235+   
 
(0.00132) -0.00132 (0.00132) 
    Delhi 
 
0.0147                 
  
(0.0145)                 
    Mumbai 
  
0.0144 
   
(0.0129) 
    _cons 0.0555*** 0.0581*** 0.0581*** 
 
(0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0161) 
    N 210 210 210 
R-sq 0.027 0.02 0.02 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10 *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 5: reg  hg i.city i.period, vce(robust) 
  
  
      
 
  
hg 
   
hg 
  
  
      
 Ahmedabad 0 
 
2009-Q4  0 
  
(.) 
 
  (.) 
Bengaluru 0.0165 
 
2010-Q1  0.0146 
  
(0.0276) 
 
  (0.0206) 
Bhopal 
 
-0.00260 
 
2010-Q2  0.0838*** 
  
(0.0238) 
 
  (0.0239) 
Chennai 
 
0.0269 
 
2010-Q3  0.0955*** 
  
(0.0213) 
 
  (0.0173) 
Delhi 
 
0.0137 
 
2010-Q4  0.0818*** 
  
(0.0181) 
 
  (0.0218) 
Faridabad -0.00301 
 
2011-Q1  -0.00758 
  
(0.0252) 
 
  (0.0157) 
Hyderabad -0.0241 
 
2011-Q2  0.107** 
  
(0.0191) 
 
  (0.0320) 
Jaipur 
 
0.0131 
 
2011-Q3  0.00705 
  
(0.0340) 
 
  (0.0154) 
Kochi 
 
-0.0242 
 
2011-Q4  0.0391* 
  
(0.0286) 
 
  (0.0172) 
Kolkata 
 
-0.0252 
 
2012-Q1  0.0113 
  
(0.0221) 
 
  (0.0218) 
Lucknow  0.00559  2012-Q2  0.0489*** 
  (0.0202)    (0.0108) 
Mumbai  0.0134  2012-Q3  0.0283* 
  (0.0197)    (0.0119) 
Patna  -0.0116  2012-Q4  0.0751*** 
  (0.0222)    (0.0144) 
Pune  0.0181  2013-Q1  0.0395* 
  (0.0221)    (0.0194) 
Surat 
 
-0.0164 
 
2013-Q2 
 
0 
 (0.0265)  (0) 
    _cons  -0.0179 
      (0.0154) 
       
N      210 
R-sq      0.169 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
 + p<0.10 *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 6: reg hg i.city i.period, vce(cluster city) 
  
 
    
 
hg    
 
hg 
        
Ahmedabad  0 2010-Q1 0 
 
(.)    
 
(.)    
Bengaluru 0.0165*** 2010-Q2 0.0692+   
 
(3.25E-17) 
 
(0.0384) 
Bhopal -0.00260*** 2010-Q3 0.0809**  
 
(3.20E-17) 
 
(0.0229) 
Chennai 0.0269*** 2010-Q4 0.0672+   
 
(3.49E-17) 
 
(0.033) 
Delhi 0.0137*** 2011-Q1 -0.0222 
 
(3.22E-17) 
 
(0.0285) 
Faridabad -0.00301*** 2011-Q2 0.0920*   
 
(3.19E-17) 
 
(0.0388) 
Hyderabad -0.0241*** 2011-Q3 -0.00754 
 
(3.19E-17) 
 
(0.0211) 
Jaipur 0.0131*** 2011-Q4 0.0245 
 
(3.23E-17) 
 
(0.028) 
Kochi -0.0242*** 2012-Q1 -0.00327 
 
(3.22E-17) 
 
(0.0295) 
Kolkata -0.0252*** 2012-Q2 0.0343 
 
(3.21E-17) 
 
(0.0236) 
Lucknow 0.00559*** 2012-Q3 0.0138 
 
(3.32E-17) 
 
(0.0253) 
Mumbai 0.0134*** 2012-Q4 0.0605+   
 
(3.38E-17) 
 
(0.0302) 
Patna -0.0116*** 2013-Q1 0.0249 
 
(3.19E-17) 
 
(0.0248) 
Pune 0.0181*** 2013-Q2 -0.0146 
 
(3.20E-17) 
 
(0.0239) 
Surat -0.0164*** _cons -0.00329 
 
(3.22E-17) 
 
(0.0206) 
    N     210 
R-sq     0.276 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 + p<0.10 *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 7: (1) xtpcse hg i.city i.period, correlation (ar1) hetonly 
 (2) xtpcse hg i.city i.period, correlation(psar1) 
 (3) xtpcse hg i.city i.period, correlation(psar1) hetonly 
  (1)  (2) (3)    (1)  (2)  (3)  
 
hg hg hg    
 
hg hg hg    
    
 
          
Ahmedabad  0 0 0 Kochi -0.0258 -0.0260 -0.0260 
 
(.) (.) (.)    
 
(0.0226) (0.0274) (0.0268) 
        Bengaluru 0.0139 0.0136 0.0136 Kolkata -0.0258 -0.0259** -0.0259 
 
(0.0202) (0.0155) (0.0188) 
 
(0.0166) (0.0082) (0.0170) 
        Bhopal -0.0042 -0.0042 -0.0042 Lucknow 0.0042 0.0045 0.0045 
 
(0.0180) (0.0215) (0.0185) 
 
(0.0149) (0.0094) (0.0140) 
        Chennai 0.0241 0.0278 0.0278 Mumbai 0.0110 0.0110 0.0110 
 
(0.0169) (0.0272) (0.0217) 
 
(0.0148) (0.0153) (0.0148) 
        Delhi 0.0131 0.0039 0.0039 Patna -0.0144 -0.0156 -0.0156 
 
(0.0144) (0.0150) -0.0207 
 
(0.0157) (0.0131) (0.0130) 
        Faridabad -0.0056 -0.0060 -0.0060 Pune 0.0159 0.0157 0.0157 
 
(0.0185) (0.0218) (0.0175) 
 
(0.0163) (0.0176) (0.0158) 
        Hyderabad -0.0262+ -0.0263+ -0.0263+   Surat -0.0175 -0.0165 -0.0165 
 
(0.0141) (0.0153) (0.0135) 
 
(0.0184) (0.0144) (0.0144) 
        Jaipur 0.0110 0.0110 0.0110 _cons -0.0015 0.0030 0.0030 
 
(0.0254) (0.0259) (0.0243) 
 
(0.0196) (0.0118) (0.0190) 
        N   
 
    210 210 210 
R-sq   
 
    0.295 0.325 0.325 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 + p<0.10 *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
 
36 
 
Figure 1: Residuals of reg hg i.city i.period, vce(robust) 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: House Prices (2001-2013) 
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Figure 3: House Price Growth (2001-2013)  
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